Scattered Spider Simulation | Breacher.ai

Categories: Deepfake,Published On: July 8th, 2026,
Scattered Spider Simulation: Deploy the Attack Before They Do | Breacher.ai
Adversary Emulation · UNC3944 / Octo Tempest

Run the Scattered Spider Attack
Before Scattered Spider Runs You.

They do not break your firewall. They call your help desk, impersonate an employee, and talk a human into resetting multi factor authentication. Then they own your identity provider. Breacher.ai reproduces that exact kill chain using OSES, and because the playbook is already built, we deploy it in days, not weeks. This is how you find out whether your people, your process, and your SOC hold before a real operator dials in.

Why Scattered Spider Wins Against Companies That Passed Every Audit

Scattered Spider, tracked across the industry as UNC3944 and Octo Tempest, is not a sophisticated exploit crew. That is exactly what makes them dangerous. They do not need a zero day. They need a phone, a believable story, and a help desk that is measured on how fast it resolves tickets. The organizations they have compromised were not careless. They had endpoint protection, email filtering, and multi factor authentication deployed. The attackers walked straight past all of it by targeting the one control that lives between a human and a keyboard: your identity verification process.

The pattern is consistent. An operator calls the service desk posing as an employee locked out of an account. They have done the reconnaissance, so they can recite the employee ID, the manager name, the recent project. Under time pressure and a convincing story, the help desk resets the password or the MFA enrollment. Minutes later the attacker is authenticated as a real user, inside the identity provider, moving toward data and domain control. No malware tripped a sensor because nothing about the login looked wrong.

Your firewall was never the target. Your help desk was. The question a Scattered Spider simulation answers is simple and uncomfortable: when a convincing stranger calls and asks to reset MFA, does your process stop them, or does it help them?

This is why a standard phishing test tells you nothing useful about your exposure to this group. Counting who clicked a link does not test whether your help desk demands identity proofing under pressure, whether your identity provider alerts on an anomalous reset, or whether your SOC connects a suspicious call to a suspicious login. Those are the controls that decide the outcome, and they are the controls a Scattered Spider simulation is built to exercise.

92%of organizations vulnerable to at least one deepfake social engineering vector
78%highly vulnerable when pressure is applied across channels, not in isolation
63%of users cannot distinguish AI generated voice from a real person

The Scattered Spider Toolkit We Reproduce

Every technique below is drawn from documented UNC3944 tradecraft and reproduced under strict authorization. We do not improvise. We run the same moves the group runs, in the same order, so what you learn maps directly to how you would actually be attacked.

T1
Help Desk Vishing for MFA Reset

The signature move. An operator calls IT support impersonating an employee and drives a live MFA or password reset. This single path is responsible for the group's biggest intrusions, and it is the one most service desks are trained to resolve quickly rather than resist. We test whether identity proofing actually happens when a caller pushes back with urgency and a good story.

Success is not a help desk that never gets a call like this. Success is a help desk that refuses the reset because the caller could not pass verification, every time, under pressure.
T2
MFA Fatigue and Push Bombing

Repeated authentication prompts fired at a target until a tired or distracted user approves one to make it stop. We measure approval rates across your workforce and the time from first prompt to compromise, then map which teams are most exposed.

The fix is usually technical, not human. We surface whether number matching and prompt throttling are actually enforced, not just enabled somewhere in config.
T3
Identity Provider Phishing

Convincing Okta and Microsoft Entra sign in captures delivered through lookalike infrastructure that mirrors the exact patterns seen in real intrusions. We measure who submits credentials and whether the session and token controls behind them hold when they do.

Credential capture is only stage one. The real finding is whether phishing resistant authentication and conditional access stop the captured credential from becoming a session.
T4
SIM Swap and Callback Pretexts

Social engineering aimed at telecom workflows and internal callback procedures to hijack SMS based codes and defeat verification that relies on a phone number. We test the process, not the individual, because the process is what fails.

This surfaces every place your organization still trusts a phone number as identity, which is more places than most security teams expect.
T5
Deepfake Voice Impersonation

Synthetic voice of a known internal contact used to defeat callback verification, the escalation Scattered Spider style actors are already field testing. When your verification step is a call back to a familiar voice, we test whether a cloned voice passes it.

If a callback to a recognized voice is your control, voice is no longer proof of identity, and we show you exactly why in a controlled setting.
T6
Living Off the Land and Remote Access

Once inside, the group uses legitimate remote access and administration tooling rather than malware, because legitimate tools do not trip antivirus. We stage the same behavior so your endpoint and detection controls are tested against what actually gets used, not against a lab sample.

The question is whether your SOC flags unexpected remote access tooling on a normal user account, which is the signal that separates detection from noise.

One Orchestrated Chain, Built on OSES

Individual techniques tested in isolation tell you almost nothing, because Scattered Spider does not attack in isolation. They chain moves together, using each one to make the next more believable. OSES, our Orchestrated Social Engineering Simulations methodology, runs the group's techniques as a single conditional campaign that adapts to how your people respond and reaches the real decision point where process and technology are supposed to intervene. Walk the chain.

S1
Stage 1 · Reconnaissance and Pretext

We build the persona from real open source intelligence: org chart, active projects, vendor relationships, employee identifiers. A target employee receives a smishing or voice touch that establishes a believable situation. Technology under test: did anything flag the inbound. People under test: did the target treat it as routine.

Technology: filteringPeople: first response
S2
Stage 2 · The Help Desk Call

An operator calls the service desk as the employee, armed with the details gathered in Stage 1, and requests a password or MFA reset. Optional deepfake voice raises the pressure. Process under test: does the help desk demand identity proofing. People under test: does the agent hold the line when the caller pushes.

Process: identity proofingPeople: pressure response
S4
Stage 4 · Access and Correlation

If the reset proceeds, the chain reaches its objective: a simulated authenticated session and a staged remote access attempt. Technology under test: did the identity provider alert on the anomalous reset and new device, did endpoint controls flag the tooling. And did the SOC correlate Stages 1 through 4 into one incident or log them as unrelated events. Correlation is the difference between catching an attack and catching four things.

Technology: IdP and endpoint alertsTechnology: SOC correlation

A disconnected phishing test stops at Stage 1 and calls it a day. Only an orchestrated chain reaches Stage 3, where your reset policy lives, and Stage 4, where correlation is provable. That is why OSES is what makes a real Scattered Spider test possible.

A Playbook Built for Instant Deployment

Most red teams quote a Scattered Spider engagement as a multi week build. Persona development, infrastructure standup, script writing, tooling, and chain logic all get constructed from zero for every client. That lead time is not caution. It is overhead, and you pay for it. Breacher.ai does not build the attack from scratch. We already built it.

We maintain a productized Scattered Spider playbook: engineered personas, help desk vishing scripts calibrated across real engagements, identity provider capture flows, MFA fatigue sequencing, deepfake voice assets, and the conditional OSES chain logic that ties it all together. The attack architecture is a standing asset, refined every time we run it. When you engage us, we are configuring a proven system to your environment, not inventing one. That collapses the timeline from weeks to days, and the only true gating steps are the ones that should gate it: scoping, authorization, and target mapping.

01
Day Zero · Scope and Authorize

We define the target population, the objectives in scope, and the hard limits, then lock legal sign off, a trusted control contact, and an abort path. Deepfake voice of named individuals requires explicit consent and a documented authorization chain, settled here first. This is the real gate, and it is the only one.

02
Rapid Contextual Tailoring

The pre-built personas and vishing scripts are tuned to your org chart, your help desk workflow, your identity provider, and your live projects. Because the frame already exists, tailoring is a configuration pass measured in hours, not a build measured in days.

03
Control Mapping Before Launch

For each objective we write down the process control that should stop it and the technology control that should detect it. This list is your scorecard, and it is standardized from prior engagements so it is ready on arrival rather than authored from scratch.

05
Same Day Findings

Because the measurement framework is standardized, findings do not wait on a lengthy write up cycle. You get the critical results, especially any successful reset or missed correlation, on the day they happen, with the full report and remediation ranking to follow.

06
Retest on Demand

After you fix a gap, the playbook redeploys against the same target to prove the fix. A control change you never retest is a control change you cannot claim, and because deployment is fast, retesting is not a second project. It is a rerun.

The strategic point: a threat this fast has to be tested by a capability that is equally fast. Scattered Spider does not spend six weeks building a campaign against you, so a six week simulation cycle is the wrong tempo. The pre-built playbook matches the adversary's speed.

What the Engagement Measures

Three layers, three sets of signals, one headline number. These are the metrics that tell you where the system actually breaks against this specific adversary, and the resilience metric at the bottom is the one your board should see.

Layer What We Test Key Metrics A Pass Looks Like
People Help desk and user decision under pressure Reset attempt outcome, escalation rate, report rate, time to report
Process Whether identity proofing engages and holds Verification enforced rate, action stopped rate, adherence under pushback
Technology Detect, prevent, correlate IdP alerting, endpoint flags, detections per stage, correlation rate, MTTD
System (headline) End to end resilience Runs where the objective was blocked despite a deceived person

Note what the headline metric is not: it is not click rate. It is the share of runs where your system stopped the attack despite a person being fooled. That single number reframes the leadership conversation from how gullible your help desk is to how many independent layers an attacker has to defeat, which is the only question that maps to real world risk.

Two Ways to Test for Scattered Spider, One Tells the Truth

The same threat can be simulated two ways. One produces a number for a slide. The other produces a map of exactly where this adversary would get through.

Generic Phishing Test

Fire a lure, count clicks, assign training. The help desk is never called, so your reset policy is never tested. Nothing multi stage happens, so correlation is never validated. You learn a click rate and nothing about whether the group that hit your industry last quarter could hit you, and since detection training barely moves that number, you run the same test again next quarter.

Scattered Spider Simulation on OSES

Run the real chain to the reset request and beyond. When a person is fooled, you find out whether identity proofing fired, whether the IdP alerted, and whether the SOC connected the call to the login. You leave with a ranked list of which layer failed and where to invest, process gap, control gap, or correlation gap, deployed in days by a pre-built playbook.

The difference is not delivery polish. It is whether the test reaches the layers where resilience against this specific group is built. A generic test optimizes the one control the research says you cannot meaningfully improve. The full chain finds the controls you can.

What a Complete Engagement Delivers

A Scattered Spider simulation should leave you with a clear, prioritized picture of where this adversary would actually get through, and what to fix first.

The Output Bar

  • A documented control map written before launch, so every result ties to a defined pass condition
  • A definitive answer on the help desk reset path: did identity proofing hold, or did the reset go through
  • People metrics framed as behavior, escalation and reporting, not a click rate scoreboard
  • A finding on each process control: did it engage, did it stop the action, did staff adhere under pushback
  • Technology validation per stage, including whether the SOC correlated the chain into one incident
  • The headline resilience number: how often the system held despite a person being deceived
  • A ranked remediation list separating process gaps, control gaps, and correlation gaps
  • A retest plan, delivered fast because the playbook redeploys in days, not weeks

Anything short of that is a phishing click rate report wearing an adversary's name. Anything at or above it is an operational assessment of how your people, process, and technology behave when the Scattered Spider chain is moving through all three at once.

The Standard Worth Holding

Scattered Spider did not invent a new class of attack. They industrialized an old one and moved fast enough that most defenders never got to the decision point in time. The deepfake era only sharpens the edge, because a convincing synthetic voice makes the person more likely to comply, which means the layers behind the person, the process and the technology, matter more than they ever have. Testing only whether someone clicks, and ignoring whether your reset policy holds, is exactly backwards.

Run the attack that reaches the reset request. Watch whether the agent resists, whether the process intervenes, and whether the SOC correlates. The breach happens when all three fail. Your job is to find out, in a simulation, which one fails first, and to find out fast.

That is the whole discipline: one orchestrated chain built on OSES, a pre-built playbook that deploys in days, three layers instrumented, and one resilience number that tells leadership the truth. Not whether your help desk can be fooled, because it can, everyone's can, but whether your organization is built to survive being fooled at the worst possible moment.

Scattered Spider UNC3944 Octo Tempest Help Desk Social Engineering MFA Reset Testing Identity Provider Attack OSES™ Orchestrated Social Engineering Deepfake Voice Deepfake Phishing Simulations Deepfake Red Team Best Deepfake Phishing Simulations

Frequently Asked Questions

Direct answers to the questions security leaders ask when scoping a Scattered Spider simulation.

Q
What is a Scattered Spider simulation?

It is an authorized adversary emulation that reproduces the tradecraft of the group tracked as Scattered Spider, UNC3944, and Octo Tempest. Rather than firing a single phishing email, it runs the real kill chain: help desk vishing to trigger an MFA or password reset, MFA fatigue, SIM swap pretexts, Okta and Entra phishing, and deepfake voice. Breacher.ai runs it as an OSES orchestrated campaign so one engagement tests people, process, and technology together.

Q
Why is Scattered Spider so hard to defend against?

Because they target process, not perimeter. The group does not exploit an unpatched server. It calls the IT help desk, impersonates an employee, and convinces a human to reset multi factor authentication. That path bypasses most technical controls because the request looks legitimate and the help desk is optimized for speed. Defending against it requires testing whether your identity proofing procedure holds under a convincing, high pressure call, which detection focused phishing tests never reach.

Q
How fast can Breacher.ai deploy the simulation?

In days, not weeks. We maintain a pre-built Scattered Spider playbook: engineered personas, help desk vishing scripts, identity provider capture flows, MFA fatigue sequencing, and a conditional OSES chain refined across engagements. Because the attack architecture already exists, deployment is a configuration pass rather than a build from scratch. Scoping, authorization, and target mapping are the gating steps, not construction of the attack itself.

Q
What is OSES (Orchestrated Social Engineering Simulations)?

OSES™ is a trademarked methodology developed by Breacher.ai for running conditional, multi stage adversary emulation campaigns built on a persistent contextual layer. Applied to Scattered Spider, OSES chains the group's techniques into one coherent campaign that reaches the real decision point, where an employee is asked to act, a procedure is asked to intervene, and the technology is asked to detect. That is what lets a single engagement test people, process, and technology at once.

Q
What controls does the simulation actually test?

Process: help desk identity proofing before a reset, out of band verification of caller identity, callback procedures, and the escalation path for suspicious requests. Technology: identity provider alerting on anomalous MFA resets, impersonation protection, endpoint blocking of remote access tooling, and whether the SOC correlated the multi stage activity into one incident. People: whether help desk staff and targeted employees escalated or complied under pressure.

Threat actor tradecraft referenced in this article reflects publicly documented reporting on the group tracked as Scattered Spider, UNC3944, and Octo Tempest through 2025. All techniques are reproduced only under written authorization and defined rules of engagement. Control examples are illustrative of common enterprise procedures and are not exhaustive. Methodology framing reflects Breacher.ai's OSES™ approach. Questions are welcome at support@breacher.ai.

Author
JT

Jason Thatcher

Founder & CEO, Breacher.ai

Jason Thatcher is the Founder and CEO of Breacher.ai and creator of OSES™ (Orchestrated Social Engineering Simulations™). He has 15+ years in cybersecurity spanning security operations, threat intelligence, and executive leadership, with prior roles at ZeroFox, Deepwatch, and GuidePoint Security. He built Breacher.ai on a simple practitioner conviction: the defense that matters is not whether users spot fakes, but whether process and technology hold when they do not. Connect on LinkedIn.

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About the Author: Jason Thatcher

Jason Thatcher is the Founder of Breacher.ai and comes from a long career of working in the Cybersecurity Industry. His past accomplishments include winning Splunk Solution of the Year in 2022 for Security Operations.

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